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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Justin Wicklund appeals from the denial of his claim for post-conviction relief 
following an evidentiary hearing. He asserts that he presented sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate his trial attorney's performance was objectively deficient and that there 
was a reasonable probability that his sentencing hearing would have been different, 
had counsel performed sufficiently. The district court pointed out that there were two 
potential factual scenarios that existed at the end of the evidence: that counsel had 
not investigated the dismissed charge from 2009, or that counsel had investigated the 
dismissed charge and chose not to present evidence in that regard to the district court 
in the new case. Mr. Wicklund argues on appeal that a preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial under 
either scenario, and so, regardless of which scenario existed, he met his burden of 
proof. 
The State's response demonstrates a misunderstanding of those arguments in 
the alterative. It believes that, simply because Mr. Wicklund did not prove which 
scenario existed, he failed to carry his burden. That, however, is not an element that 
Mr. Wicklund was required to prove under the Strickland test, 1 especially given the 
specific facts of his case. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel only requires 
that Mr. Wicklund demonstrate that his attorney's performance was objectively 
unreasonable and prejudicial, which he did. He must demonstrate both prongs of the 
Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., show it is more likely true that 
1 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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his attorney performed ineffectively and prejudicially). However, the State believes that 
Mr. Wicklund was also required to show the exact factual scenario that unfolded. In 
doing so, it ignores the fact that, under either scenario, Mr. Wicklund met his burden. 
Because he demonstrated ineffective assistance under either scenario, it is not 
necessary to prove which scenario existed. Regardless of which was true, 
Mr. Wicklund still proved the elements of an ineffective assistance claim under 
Strickland, and therefore, the State's contention in this regard is meritless. 
The State's response also demonstrates a misunderstanding of the prejudice 
prong of the Strickland analysis. It contends that Mr. Wicklund has to demonstrate that 
a different result would have resulted in absence of the error. That interpretation is 
contradictory to the standard in Strickland itself. It has also been subsequently rejected 
by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho's courts. All Mr. Wicklund needs to 
show to demonstrate prejudice is a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have 
been different. Applying the correct standard, Mr. Wicklund did show prejudice by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's 
decision to deny Mr. Wicklund's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Wicklund's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wicklund's Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief 
A. The State Is Mistaken Regarding The First Prong Of The Strickland Analysis; 
Mr. Wicklund Did Prove Objectively Deficient Performance In Both Of The 
Alternative Factual Scenarios That Could Have Existed In This Case 
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, Mr. Wicklund was required to prove 
that his attorney performed in an objectively unreasonable manner. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687; Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006). In this case, upon the close 
of evidence, the district court determined that two potential factual scenarios could exist. 
The State contends that, because Mr. Wicklund did not prove which of those two 
scenarios actually existed, his claim must fail. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10, 12-13.) That 
argument, however, misunderstands the standard in Strickland. The only thing that a 
petitioner must prove is that, in a given factual scenario, his attorney's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Since 
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Wicklund's attorney 
performed ineffectively in both of the identified factual scenarios, he met the Strickland 
standard. 
In a post-conviction case, the petitioner only needs to prove his claims by a 
"preponderance of the evidence." See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560 (2008); 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004). This means that he only needs to show that, 
based on a consideration of all the evidence presented, it is more likely than not that his 
version of events is true. Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481 
(2003) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that when weighing all of the 
evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is more probably 
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true than not."); In re Beyer,_ P.3d _, 2013 Opinion No.32, p.5 (Ct. App. 2013) ("A 
preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence shows something to be more 
probably true than not."). In this case, Mr. Wicklund presented evidence to support his 
claims, and the State presented no evidence to weigh against his evidence. As such, 
Mr. Wicklund contends that he has met the preponderance burden. 
In this case, Mr. Wicklund has proven that his attorney's performance fell below 
that objective standard in two alternative situations.2 In the first alternative scenario, 
Mr. Wicklund's attorney failed to sufficiently investigate Mr. Wicklund's prior criminal 
history (specifically, the dismissed 2009 charge), even though, as the State 
acknowledges, trial counsel was aware that the past charge existed and was aware of 
the damage the nature of the charge itself (as it existed, unexplained) could do. (See 
Resp. Br., p.10.) However, it is objectively unreasonable for an attorney to not conduct 
investigations on evidence which, when known to a reasonable attorney, would lead 
that reasonable attorney to investigate further, particularly if the prosecution will 
probably rely on that evidence. See Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App. 
2006); see a/so, e.g, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519-38 (2003) (finding that 
2 Admittedly, had Mr. Wicklund failed to show objectively deficient performance 
under either scenario, the State's contention in this regard may have some merit. 
Mr. Wicklund simply made his task more difficult by arguing both of the alternative 
factual scenarios. (See R., p.9 (alleging in item E that counsel was unaware of the 
nature of the 2009 case, indicating a failure to investigate it at all); R., p.73 (asserting 
that trial counsel "did not object enough" in regard to the 2009 Affidavit, indicating the 
failure was in not adequately presenting evidence in that regard).) However, just 
because the task is harder does not mean that it cannot be successful completed. In 
this case, the uncontradicted testimony from Mr. Rockstahl established that trial 
counsel's performance was deficient under both scenarios. Therefore, Mr. Wicklund 
presented sufficient evidence to overcome the burden he set for himself, demonstrating 
that his attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable in both of the scenarios at 
issue. Therefore, in this particular case, it does not matter which scenario existed 
because, regardless, Mr. Wicklund has met his burden under Strickland. 
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counsel's failure to conduct an investigation into potentially mitigating evidence was 
objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 390-99 (2000) (same) . Mr. Rockstahl testified that a reasonable attorney would 
conduct additional investigation on this sort of information. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.19 - p.15, 
L.6.) That testimony was uncontradicted and Mr. Rockstahl did not recant that 
testimony on cross-examination.3 (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) Therefore, Mr. Wicklund 
met his burden to prove that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable by a 
preponderance of the evidence under the first alternative scenario. 
In the second alternative scenario, Mr. Wicklund's attorney had gathered this 
information but failed to present it to the district court. Part of counsel's job is to present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 
2007). Again, Mr. Rockstahl offered uncontradicted testimony that a reasonable 
attorney would present this sort of mitigating information to the district court, especially 
given the particular facts of this case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.19 - p.15, L.6.) Again, the 
State did not present any evidence to the contrary on this point, nor did Mr. Rockstahl 
3 The State contends that Mr. Rockstahl made certain concessions on cross-
examination which undermine his overall testimony. (See Resp. Br., pp.9, 12.) It is 
mistaken. Those concessions were in regard to a tangentially relevant fact -
Mr. Rockstahl's personal opinion about the credibility of the alleged victim of the 2009 
crime. (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, L.8 - p.19, L.11.) Mr. Rockstahl's personal conclusion about 
the credibility of the witness is irrelevant to whether Mr. Wicklund's attorney performed 
in an objectively reasonable manner in regard to trial counsel's investigation of the 2009 
case. Even if Mr. Rockstahl's opinion was not based on a discussion with the victim, it 
still would have been important for trial counsel to know that Mr. Rockstahl had found 
those witnesses, and if trial counsel still had concerns about the veracity of 
Mr. Rockstahl's opinion of the alleged victim's story, he could, and indeed, should have 
conducted additional investigation based on Mr. Rockstahl's opinion. See Murphy, 143 
Idaho at 146. Therefore, the State's contention about Mr. Rockstahl's concessions 
actually only further proves that trial counsel's performance was objectively 
unreasonable under Strickland. 
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recant that testimony. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) As such, Mr. Wicklund met his met his 
burden to prove that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable by a 
preponderance of the evidence under the second alternative scenario as well. 
Therefore, Mr. Wicklund met his burden under either of the alternative scenarios, 
and so met his burden under Strickland. As such, he only needed to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective 
performance, in order to merit relief. As he did so, this Court should reverse the district 
court's decision to deny his claim for post-conviction relief. 
B. The State Misunderstands The Applicable Standard Under The Prejudice Prong 
Of The Strickland Test 
The State argues that, because Mr. Wicklund did not prove that the outcome of 
his sentencing would have been different had counsel performed in an objectively 
reasonable manner, he failed to prove the prejudice prong under Strickland. (See 
Resp. Br., p.13 ("It is difficult to imagine any such argument would change the court's 
view of the allegations in the 2009 Affidavit in any positive way.") (emphasis added).) 
That position has been rejected by the courts. Strickland only requires that the 
petitioner show "that there is a reasonable possibility" that the outcome would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 
defined a reasonable probability as a showing sufficient to "undermine confidence in the 
outcome" of the hearing. Id. (emphasis added). Undermining confidence in an 
outcome is not the same as requiring an affirmative showing that a particular alternative 
outcome would necessarily exist: "We note that the prejudice prong does not require 
proof that counsel's errors would have altered the outcome of the proceedings. Rather 
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it requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's inadequate performance, the 
outcome would have been different." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443-44 (internal citations 
omitted); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (pointing out that the 
reasonable probability standard does not require the petitioner to show that his 
attorney's deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome of the 
hearing); cf. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 482 (Ct. App. 2013) (emphasizing the same 
point when analyzing a similar standard to show prejudice under Idaho's fundamental 
error test). 
The reasonable probability standard recognizes the fundamental difference 
between requiring the defendant to make an affirmative showing that "the outcome 
would have been different," as opposed to demonstrating "the reasonable possibility 
that the outcome would have been different." The State's response fails to grasp this 
fundamental distinction. (See Resp. Br., p.13 (arguing that Mr. Wicklund was required 
to show that he would have received a more favorable sentence had his attorney 
performed in a reasonably objective manner).) As such, the State's assertion that 
Mr. Wicklund needed to make a showing that the outcome of his sentencing hearing 
would be affirmatively different in order to obtain relief misunderstands the law and 
should be rejected, as it has previously been rejected by the courts. See Nix, 475 U.S. 
at 175; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443-44; cf. Day, 154 Idaho at 482. 
In any case, Mr. Wicklund did prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
there was a reasonable possibility that counsel's errors impacted the ultimate outcome. 
The district court asserted that "there have been incidents involving similar behavior" 
based on the 2009 Affidavit, which was, in turn, based only on the alleged victim's 
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statements. (Tr., Vol.4, p.26, Ls.5-7.) However, Mr. Rockstahl testified that he had 
contacted several witnesses who contradicted the complaining witness's version of 
events (i.e., were willing to testify that the complaining witness's version of events was 
not true). (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.10-11.) There is assuredly a reasonable possibility that 
the district court, having been informed that the claims in the 2009 Affidavit were 
contradicted, to the point that the defense attorney on the case believed that the State 
did not feel it had a case, would not then make the factually-erroneous assertion that 
"the potential for future risk I find is significant, and the potential for societal harm where 
there has been incidents involving similar behavior," since such a finding would be 
clearly erroneous in light of a full understanding of the 2009 case. As such, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the sentence would be more lenient because there would not 
have been the finding of similar past behavior, which the district court weighed as an 
aggravating factor. Therefore, the uncontradicted evidence in this regard (the testimony 
of Mr. Rockstahl) proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the outcome would have been different, had trial counsel performed in an 
objectively reasonable manner. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wicklund respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2013. 
B AN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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